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Non-technical summary
The change in the business model of venture capitalists from investing locally towards investing across borders started to intensify in the late 1990s. Compared to domestic investments, cross-border investments are likely to be associated with higher transaction and information costs. The reason for this is that venture capital is typically invested in opaque risky ventures where information asymmetries between the entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists are particularly pronounced and which therefore require intensive pre-investment screening, post-investment hands-on management support and control. Nevertheless, there are at least two potential benefits that might outweigh the higher costs of investing across borders. By crossing borders, venture capitalists are able to exploit return differences between their home country and the portfolio companies' countries. But even if return differences were absent, venture capitalists might invest abroad in order to diversify their portfolios geographically and to reduce their country-specific risks.
In this paper we study the economic determinants of cross-border and domestic venture capital investments. A better understanding of the determinants behind domestic and cross-border venture capital investments is interesting to academics as well as to policy makers since cross-border venture capital inflows may compensate for potential limits in the domestic venture capital supply. We use a European and North-American country dataset and start by simultaneously analyzing how economic determinants shape domestic venture capital investments (i.e., when the venture capitalist is located in the same country as the portfolio company) and gross cross-border venture capital inflows (i.e., when the venture capitalist is located outside the country under focus). We find that countries with higher patent counts have a higher number of domestic investments as well as gross cross-border inflows than countries with lower patent counts. Countries with higher expected economic growth have a higher number of gross cross-border inflows than countries with low growth prospects. In addition, countries with viable stock markets have more domestic investments and are more successful in attracting investments from foreign venture capitalists than countries with unviable stock markets.
We continue by investigating whether venture capital inflows compensate for potential limits in the domestic venture capital supply and analyze net cross-border venture capital inflows for country pairs.
We define net cross-border inflows as the gross cross-border inflows attracted by the i-country portfolio companies from the k-country venture capitalists minus the gross cross-border outflows, which i-country venture capitalists invest into k-country portfolio companies. Our results indicate that countries with higher expected growth and lagged stock market returns receive larger net cross-border inflows. Moreover, a higher stock market capitalization and a more favorable environment for venture capital intermediation lead to lower net cross-border inflows. These finding may indicate that venture capitalists located in countries with viable stock markets can raise funds at more favorable conditions and venture capitalists located in countries with attractive tax and legal environments for venture capital intermediation have incentives to invest their funds in jurisdictions with less favorable tax and legal conditions. Thus, net cross-border inflows compensate limits in the local venture capital supply.
Introduction
The change in the business model of venture capitalists from investing locally towards investing across borders started to intensify in the late 1990s (Aizenman and Kendall 2008) . Compared to domestic investments, cross-border investments are likely to be associated with higher transaction and information costs (see, e.g., Wright et al. 2005, Cumming and Johan 2007a) . The reason for this is that venture capital is typically invested in opaque risky ventures where information asymmetries between the entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists are particularly pronounced and which therefore require intensive pre-investment screening, post-investment hands-on management support and control (see, e.g., Amit et al. 1998) . Nevertheless, there are at least two potential benefits that might outweigh the higher costs of investing across borders. By crossing borders, venture capitalists are able to exploit differences in risk-adjusted expected returns between their home country and the portfolio companies' countries, which may arise due to a better economic environment in foreign countries. But even if return differences were absent, venture capitalists might invest abroad in order to diversify their portfolios geographically and to reduce their country-specific risks.
In this paper we study the economic determinants of cross-border venture capital investments. To complete the picture, we complement the analysis of cross-border flows by investigating domestic venture capital investments. Given the role of venture capital finance for the countries' economic progress (see, e.g., a survey article by Strömberg 2009 summarizing its impact on economic growth, employment, innovative activity, company performance, etc.), it is vital to understand the geography of venture capital finance. A better understanding of the determinants behind domestic and cross-border venture capital investments is not only important to academics and practitioners but also to policy makers since, as we will show later, cross-border venture capital inflows may compensate for potential limits in the domestic venture capital supply. With the international dimension in venture capital finance, public policy becomes much more complex, as its actions do not only affect investments by domestic venture capitalists in domestic and foreign companies, but also foreign venture capitalists' participation in this particular country. Therefore, public policy that aims at fostering local venture capital industries has to take into account the internationalization in venture capital finance.
There is a long list of studies dealing with the determinants of domestic venture capital investments at the country level (see, e.g., Jeng and Wells 2000, Allen and Song 2005, Romain and van Pottelsberghe 2004 , Da Rin et al. 2006 , Armour and Cumming 2006 . Some of these country analyses have been framed in a demand-supply framework, which we augment to a two-country case to study cross-border flows. In our two-country framework, cross-border venture capital flows are caused by expected return differences between the two countries. Expected return differences may result from economic determinants that shape either the venture capital demand or supply. Demand-specific determinants, such as the creativeness of entrepreneurs in the country, are supposed to give rise to a positive return differential on the side of the "creative" country, implying that venture capital finance flows from the "uncreative" country to the "creative" country. Supply-specific determinants, such as the tax and legal environment for venture capital intermediation, are conjectured to generate a positive return differential on the side of the "unfavorable-environment" country, implying that venture capital finance flows from a country with a favorable environment to a country with an unfavorable environment.
We Ribeiro et al. 2006 , Dixit and Jayaraman 2001 , Wright et al. 2005 , Manigart et al. 2006 , particularly from the perspective of the company that receives venture capital funding.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 employs a simple neoclassical supplydemand framework as a tool to predict the direction of net cross-border venture capital flows.
Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 investigates the determinants of domestic investments, gross cross-border inflows at a country level and, finally, net cross-border inflows at a country-pair level. Section 5 summarizes our main findings and concludes.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
To yield hypotheses on the impact of economic determinants on cross-border inflows, we use a simple neoclassical supply-demand model of a closed economy that we augment to a two-country setting, which allows us to analyze cross-border flows. In the closed economy the venture capital demand results from companies' needs to finance investment projects with positive net present values. When the risk-adjusted expected return (hereafter referred to as expected return) required by the investors increases, companies demand a lower quantity of venture capital finance because fewer projects with positive net present values exist. Thus, the demand curve is downward sloping. The venture capital supply in the closed economy results from the willingness of limited partners, such as pension funds and insurance companies, to invest in this asset class, as well as from resources available in the country to set up and to manage venture capital funds (in particular human capital). At least two reasons exist why a higher quantity supplied has to go along with higher expected returns (i.e., the supply curve is upward sloping). First, if the capital gains of limited partners are subject to non-unique tax rates, higher-taxed investors only provide capital for venture capital funds when they are compensated with a higher expected return (Gompers and Lerner 1998 depicts the expected return and the quantity of venture capital finance in equilibrium. Ceteris paribus, a higher demand implies a higher expected return for each quantity of venture capital finance.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Similarly, several economic determinants affect the position of the supply curve. The viability of the stock market is not only relevant for the demand, but also for the supply of venture capital because a viable stock market allows venture capitalists to build up a reputation by successfully exiting from their portfolio companies via an initial public offering. Venture capitalists may profit from this reputation by raising funds from limited partners at more favorable conditions (Gompers 1996) . The position of the supply curve also depends on capital income taxes (see Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2002, 2004) and other elements of the fiscal environment relevant for venture capital intermediation, such as VAT on carried interest and management fees. High taxes on carried interest and management fees may destroy the managers' incentives to select, monitor and support the portfolio companies. Moreover, the legal environment determines the quality of support that the venture capitalists offer their portfolio companies (Bottazzi et al. 2005) , the structure of contracts and deal characteristics (Lerner and Schoar 2004) , and the efficiency of project screening and deal origination (Cumming et al. 2009 ). For a country with a high and a low venture capital supply, respectively, Panel a of Figure 1 (right picture) depicts the return and the quantity of venture capital finance in a state of equilibrium. Ceteris paribus, a higher supply implies a lower expected return for each quantity of venture capital finance.
To yield hypotheses on the determinants of cross-border flows we augment this simple demandsupply model of a closed economy to a two-country framework; the two countries are assumed to be identical apart from either the demand or the supply. To exemplify what may drive cross-border investments, let country i have a higher venture capital demand than country k. This case will be further illustrated in Panel b of Figure 1 . In the absence of cross-border venture capital flows, the expected return is higher in country i (left picture) than in k (right picture). The positive expected return difference between the countries i and k, caused by differences in economic determinants that shape the venture capital demand, incentivizes venture capitalists from country k to invest in country i. In the absence of distorting factors, such as transaction and information costs, the expected returns and quantities would be equalized in both countries in the new equilibrium. However, distorting factors cannot be neglected in the context of venture capital. To invest across borders, higher expected returns abroad have to outweigh the costs, which are likely to be higher for cross-border than for domestic investments (e.g., Wright et al. 2005, Cumming and Johan 2007a) . As a result, the return difference may decrease if cross-border flows take place, but are unlikely to disappear completely. These considerations lead to the following hypotheses:
H 1: Economic determinants that increase the venture capital demand (the creativeness and expected growth)
 will increase domestic investments in country i.
 will increase cross-border inflows that country i attracts from any other country.
H 2: Economic determinants that increase the venture capital supply (tax and legal environment for venture capital intermediation)
 will decrease cross-border inflows that country i attracts from any other country.
H 3: Economic determinants that increase the venture capital demand as well as the supply (stock market viability and the legal framework)
 will increase or decrease cross-border inflows that country i attracts from any other 
, where L D is the demand and L S the supply curve shift.
The discussion above is based on the conjecture that venture capitalists exploit differences in expected returns when they invest abroad. However, venture capitalists may invest abroad to diversify their portfolios geographically and to reduce country-specific risks. Venture capitalists' diversification motives may result in cross-border flows even if differences in expected returns are absent and it may initiate venture capital flows in both directions, i.e., from country i to k and from country k to i, at the same time. Because of this diversification motive, gross cross-border inflows may not necessarily respond to expected return differences as formulated in our hypotheses. Therefore, we also analyze net cross-border inflows, which show whether a country "imports" or "exports" venture capital and which might therefore better reflect the exploitation of expected return differences. Our definition of net cross-border inflows differs from the one used in other studies on cross-border equity flows: Portes and Rey (2005) , for example, focus on changes in portfolio positions, and calculate net cross-border flows as securities' purchases of k-country companies by i-country citizens minus securities' sales of k-country companies by i-country citizens.
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The data capitalists from other investors, we analyzed investors' business descriptions and retained only those deals in which the business description of at least one investor included the terms "venture capital" or "private equity". In some cases, the identity of the investor in Zephyr is indicated on the level of the fund, in other cases on the level of the venture capital company. Also, in case of dependent private equity companies, sometimes the parent company, whereas in other cases the subsidiary is indicated as the investor in a particular deal. We created a consistent pattern by using the information on the For the equilibrium return without cross-border flows we obtain:
Data source for venture capital investments
A positive expected return difference between countries i and k requires:
Whenever b>d, a positive expected return difference between i and k implies that the demand shift is larger than the supply shift.
ultimate parent of the venture capitalist. 2 This procedure changed the relevant information on venture capitalists (country of origin) in 3 percent of the cases only.
Besides a simple deal count, we also employ the aggregated volume of domestic investments and cross-border inflows. For approximately 80 percent of the deals, Zephyr obtains information on the total deal volume, which is the total volume invested in the portfolio company plus the volume eventually paid to the exiting shareholders. We approximate missing deal volumes by predicted volumes from a linear regression model using the deal and the deal country characteristics as RHS variables. More specifically, we include dummy variables for the country and the year of the deal, the industry affiliation of the portfolio company as well as the number of venture capitalists that participated in the deal. Almost all variables have a significant impact on the deal volume. However, with an adjusted R 2 of about 30 percent, the explanatory power of the regression is moderate.
Researchers working in the field of venture capital and private equity have recently started to account for the Zephyr database (e.g., Goossens et al. 2008 , Abdesselam et al. 2008 , Prijcker et al. 2009 ).
Nevertheless, it is useful to assess its completeness by comparing it with the data in other studies and other available databases. In the Zephyr database, we count a total of 38,125 domestic and cross- Thomson. However, the huge advantage of Zephyr is that it offers better information on deal volume than Thomson. For our purpose this information is necessary because we need to calculate the volume of domestic investments and cross-border inflows.
Dependent variables
To calculate the number and volume of domestic investment and cross-border inflows at the country level as well as at the country-pair level, we were obliged to set some assumptions since many venture capital deals are syndicated, i.e. several domestic and/or foreign venture capitalists participate in the same deal. When at least one venture capitalist is located outside the portfolio company country, we define the deal as being a cross-border deal. Regarding the number of investments, each deal counts only once when all venture capitalists that participate in a deal are located in one country.
2 However, a noteworthy characteristic of the dataset is that parent company information in Zephyr is updated regularly, so that -relying only on the information indicated in the field "parent company" -we have not been able to trace back changes in the organizational structure. What is a drawback of this feature? Let investor A take over a share in the target company Z on January 1st 2004. If another investor B took over investor A on January 1st 2003, we would attribute the above mentioned deal to B, because B became A's parent before the transaction had been conducted. However, if B took over A on January 1st 2005, the above deal is carried out by A, because at the date of the deal, A and B were independent. Using the parent information offered by Zephyr -we would falsely assign this deal to B because B is indicated as A's parent. To correct this "mistake" we have checked (within the Zephyr deal database) whether all our investors were acquired or merged during our observation period. All deals before a potential acquisition or merger date (in the latter example January 1st 2005) have been assigned to the original investor, all deals after this date to its parent company.
A deal counts more than once only if investors from different countries, e.g., the United Kingdom and For our empirical analyses of domestic investments and cross-border inflows, we take into account that the countries in our sample vary substantially in size. Therefore, we normalize the domestic investments and cross-border inflows by the GDP. This normalization eliminates a bias towards findings of positive relationships between investments and economic determinants purely based on the country size. Since the normalized domestic investments and cross-border inflows are positively skewed (for example, the skewness is 1.82 for the normalized domestic investment volume and 1.45 for the normalized cross-border inflows) we additionally use a log transformation (see, e.g., Dahl and Shrieves 1999). Panel a of Table 2 gives summary statistics and definitions of our dependent variables.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Determinants
Our determinants capture several facets of the differences between countries that are likely to be correlated with the expected return differences and the costs for carrying out cross-border investments. We normalize all size-sensitive RHS variables with GDP. Panel b of Table 2 exhibits summary statistics, definitions and sources of our RHS variables. Correlations between RHS variables are depicted in Table 3 : Panel a for the country-level dataset and Panel b for the country-pair dataset.
In the country-pair dataset, all country-level RHS variables are employed in country-pair differences (defined as the value of a variable in country i minus the value of the variable in country k).
We employ three demand-related variables. To capture the technological creativeness in a country, we use patent counts. We suppose that a country with a high number of patents in the past has more entrepreneurs coming up with innovative ideas which lead to a higher demand for venture capital finance (cf. Ueda and Hirukawa 2008 , Cumming et al. 2009 ). We do not use these general tax and legal indicators because they capture economy-wide characteristics, whereas our VC indicator is particularly designed to capture the tax and legal environment relevant for venture capital activity.
Besides this VC indicator that is related to both the venture capital demand and supply, we construct another indicator that combines the tax and legal factors from the Benchmarking Reports that can be attributed to the venture capital supply only. This VC-supply indicator combines the information on the "funds structure" and "retaining talent in fund management companies". More specifically, the indicator contains the following items: (i) Tax French, German, Scandinavian, and English law tradition. Second, we create a dummy variable equal to one when the same language is spoken in the two countries. This dummy variable is based on all official languages spoken in the two countries. Third, we use the log of the physical distance between the two countries.
Univariate tests
We begin our analysis by testing whether domestic investments and cross-border inflows vary systematically along with our economic determinants. For each economic determinant of interest, we divide the sample into those countries that have high values in the respective determinant (above the median value of the sample population) and those countries that have low values (below the median).
We then test whether the average number and volume of domestic investments and cross-border inflows differ between these two subsamples. We normalize the investment number and volume by country GDP and use a log transformation. [Insert Table 4 
Econometric analyses

Domestic investments and gross cross-border inflows at the country level
Our econometric analyses start by investigating the determinants of venture capital investments at a country level. The determinants discussed in Section 2 should shape total venture capital investments which contain domestic investments and gross cross-border inflows in a given country. Thus, we have two dependent variables: domestic investments and gross cross-border inflows in country i and in year t. We either use the investment number or volume that we normalize by country GDP and we use a log transformation. To minimize potential endogeneity of our RHS variables, we use their lagged values, except for expected growth. Additionally, we include country and year dummies. Since we have 17 countries in our sample, we include 16 country dummy variables; the reference country is the United States. We employ seemingly unrelated regression framework (Wooldridge 2002 , Chapter 7).
Our estimation results, which we present in Table 5 , suggest the following: In line with our first hypothesis, which deals with the impact of the demand-specific determinants, we find that countries with higher lagged patent counts have a significantly higher number of domestic investments than countries with lower patent counts. The economic effect of patent counts is, however, moderate in size: The transformed number of domestic investments, which is 4.2 on average (see Panel a of Table 2 ), increases by 0.36 when the patent counts increase by one-standard deviation. We also find that countries with higher patent counts have larger gross cross-border inflows. However, patent counts are only significant for the number but not for the volume of gross cross-border inflows. In addition, countries with higher expected growth have larger gross cross-border inflows.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Corresponding to our third hypothesis, which deals with the demand and supply-specific determinants, we find that the market capitalization significantly increases the number and volume of domestic (results not depicted, but available upon request): when we exclude all country dummy variables, the VC indicator has the expected negative and significant effect on domestic investments, while its effect on gross cross-border inflows remains insignificant. The VC-supply indicator affects domestic investments and gross cross-border inflows significantly negatively. We yield similar results when we exclude all country dummy variables that have correlation coefficients above 0.4 (see Panel a of Table 3 ).
Net cross-border inflows by country pairs
Since net cross-border inflows do not only depend on the characteristics of the portfolio-company country but also on the characteristics of the country in which the venture capitalists are located, we analyze net cross-border inflows by country pairs. Our dependent variables are the number and volume of net cross-border inflows calculated as the investments that portfolio companies located in country i attract from venture capitalists located in country k minus the investments venture capitalists located in country i originate in country k. Our dataset consists of 17x16=272 country pairs and nine years (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) ; in total we have 2,448 country-pair-year observations. In our analysis of net cross-border flows, however, we only use 136 country pairs and thus 1,224 country-pair-year observations, since net cross-border inflows are symmetrical (see Panel c of Table 1 ), i.e. the amount of positive net cross-border inflows from country i to k equals the amount of negative net cross-border inflows from country k to i.
In Table 6 we present estimation results from alternative model specifications with respect to the inclusion of RHS variables. In line with our first hypothesis, the number and volume of net crossborder inflows from country i to country k increase (more investments are attracted than are originated) when the difference in expected growth and stock market returns between country i and k widens. This effect may indicate that countries that are likely to come up with more investment opportunities (with higher expected growth and higher returns) attract more foreign venture capitalists on the one hand and on the other hand the venture capitalists located in these countries invest less often abroad. The number and volume of net cross-border inflows decrease when the difference in the stock market capitalization between countries i and k increases. This effect supports the view that viable stock markets are important for venture capitalists' fundraising. Being located in countries with viable stock markets facilitates the fund raising process for venture capitalists; the funds are then invested in promising portfolio companies located at home and abroad.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The tax and legal environment also influences net cross-border inflows. The expected impact of the VC indicator on net cross-border flows is unclear (see hypothesis 3) since it combines the tax and legal environment relevant for the venture capital demand and supply. Our results suggest that the VC indicator (lower value is advantageous) has a negative impact on net cross-border inflows indicating that a poor environment prevents foreign venture capitalists from investing in a country. The VCsupply indicator (lower value is advantageous) is expected to have a positive effect on net crossborder inflows since it is relevant for the supply only. The difference in the VC-supply indicator between country i and k has the expected positive effect on the number and volume of net crossborder inflows. This positive coefficient suggests that countries with less favorable environments for venture capital intermediation receive more venture capital from abroad than the venture capitalists located in these countries invest abroad.
In Columns (4)- (5) and (9)-(10) of Table 6 we put particular emphasis on those country pairs for which no deal in either direction has occurred. By construction, the net cross-border inflows between countries i and k can either be positive, negative or zero. In our sample, 508 of the 1,224 country-pairyear observations are equal to zero because no cross-border investments in either direction have taken place. A two-step selection model (Heckman 1979) helps us to account for the possibility that the existence and the size of cross-border flows are driven by different processes. In the selection regression (results not depicted) we estimate the inverse Mills ratio, which we then include as an additional RHS variable in the outcome regression. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 150
replications to control for the fact that the inverse Mills ratio is a generated regressor. In the selection regression the dependent variable is equal to one when we observe cross-border flows between country i and k at least in one direction, and zero otherwise. As RHS variables we use the differences in the economic determinants between the two countries, country and year dummy variables and the cultural and geographical proximity between country i and k. As the results in Columns (4)- (5) and (9)- (10) show, the coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio are insignificant at conventional significance levels in the outcome regression indicating that a selection bias does not seem to be relevant in this context.
In Columns (5) and (10) we additionally tackle another issue, namely the choice of country dummy variables. In Columns (1)- (4) and (6)- (9) we include country dummy variables which are equal to one when the country is either country i or country k. Since we have 17 countries, we include 16 country dummy variables, leaving one country (the United States) as the reference country. In Columns (5) and (10), we follow a different approach: we include dummy variables for both countries (i and k) separately, i.e. we generate 17 country i and 17 country k dummy variables. As an example, for net cross-border inflows between Austria (country i) and the United States (country k), the Austrian country i dummy variable is equal to one for Austria and equal to zero for the United States, while the US country k dummy variable is equal to one for the United States and equal to zero for Austria. 3 As the estimation results in Columns (5) and (10) show, including country i as well as country k dummy variables instead of simple country dummies does not substantially change our estimation results on how economic determinants affect net cross-border inflows.
Dynamics in net cross-border inflows by country pairs
Finally, we test dynamic responses in net cross-border inflows by country pairs. There are several To test for dynamic responses, we extend the model used in the last subsection by including a lag of dependent variables and by modeling a fixed effect for each of the 136 country pairs. The fixed effects for country pairs resolve problems otherwise arising from unobserved time invariant heterogeneity in 3 However, given the construction of the net cross-border inflows, some country i and k dummy variables experience no or little variation over our sample. For example, the US country i dummy variable and the Austrian country k dummy variable are never equal to one. Therefore, we include only 13 country i and 13 country k dummy variables.
bilateral country relationships, which might influence net cross-border inflows, such as the protection of shareholders. We use the dynamic panel-data estimator (which is a generalized method of moments estimator) proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and a finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) . The estimation results will be consistent if we use appropriate instruments for the lagged dependent variable, and if there is no second-order or higher-order autocorrelation. Therefore, we test for overidentifying restrictions (Arellano and Bond 1991, Blundell and Bond 1998) .
In Table 7 we present the estimation results for the number and volume of net cross-border inflows.
The test results on overidentifying restrictions and autocorrelation fully verify our modeling approach.
The lagged dependent variable has a positive coefficient, which is statistically significant for the number and volume of net cross-border inflows. Thus, higher net cross-border inflows in the previous year even lead to higher net cross-border inflows in the current year. The signs and significance levels of some economic determinants are even contained in this dynamic specification of the model, which includes a fixed effect for each country pair, similar to the results in the static specification presented in Table 6 . The difference in the stock market capitalization has a significantly negative effect, while the difference in expected growth has a significantly positive effect on net cross-border inflows.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Extensions and robustness
There is an on-going debate as to whether investments by governmental authorities influence the level We follow this literature and extend the models presented in Tables 5 -7 by an additional regressor that captures how much venture capital government authorities provide. We use (i) the investments by the government relative to total investments in each country and (ii) new funds provided by the government for venture capital investments relative to total new funds raised in each country. We employ both variables since the correlation between investments and new funds by the government is only moderate (the correlation coefficient is 0.3). In these extended models, we find that governmental venture capital is not significantly related to domestic investments, which is in line with the findings by Armour and Cumming (2006) . New funds provided by the government have a significant negative effect on gross cross-border inflows, but they do not affect net cross-border inflows. On the contrary, investments by the government have no effect on gross cross-border inflows, but net cross-border inflows increase through governmental venture capital investments. Thus, our results on the role of governmental venture capital are not clear-cut. However, in these various extensions, the signs and significance levels of the other variables remain unchanged when we include governmental venture capital.
As a robustness test, we exclude the United States and United Kingdom from the sample because these economies are much more market-based than the rest of our sample in terms of market capitalization as well as turnover (e.g., 
Summary and concluding remarks
We used a dataset of venture capital investments in European and North-American countries to investigate the economic determinants of net cross-border venture capital inflows for country pairs. 
Acknowledgements:
The authors are indebted to the Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) for providing data. 
Panel b -Gross cross-border inflows by country pairs (in million Euros)
Country in which the venture capitalist is located Country of the company  AUS  BEL  CN  DEN  FIN  FRA  GER  IRE  IT  NET  NOR  POR  ES  SD  SW  UK  US  Total   Austria  3  0  3  0  4  453  3  8  20  0  0  0  0  86  145  176  901   Belgium  0  0  18  0  262  126  0  4  381  0  0  0  0  26  407  2,032  3,255   Canada  0  0  49  31  56  81  15  0  125  16  0  18  8  123  774  5, Note: The number and volume of venture capital investments in 17 countries is aggregated over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Panel a provides information on domestic investments (the venture capitalist is located in the same country as the portfolio company), gross cross-border inflows (only the portfolio company, but not the venture capitalist, is located in the country under focus) and gross cross-border outflows (only the venture capitalist, but not the company, is located in the country under focus) at the country level. Panel b depicts gross cross-border inflows for country pairs. Panel c depicts net cross-border inflows for country pairs defined as investments attracted by country i from venture capitalists located in country k minus investments attracted by k from i. All figures are based on the Zephyr database. Table 2 Summary statistics Note: Summary statistics for the dependent and RHS variables are based on annual data from 17 European and North-American countries. The mean of net cross-border inflows is based on 136 of the total 272 country pairs in our dataset since net cross-border inflows from country i to k equal the negative net cross-border inflows from country k to i. The mean net cross-border inflows based on all country pairs is, obviously, equal to zero. Table 2 .  is the difference between country i and k.
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level. The results of mean tests are with unequal variances; the data in our sample are separated according to whether the economic determinant of a country is above or below the median value of the sample. All variables are defined in Table 2 .  is the difference between country i and k (i minus k). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
where DD denotes the domestic investments (the venture capitalist and portfolio company are located in country i) and CB denotes gross cross-border inflows (the portfolio company but not the venture capitalist is located in country i) in year t normalized by GDP and logarithmized. All variables are defined in Table 2 . Country and year dummy variables are included. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
where NCB denotes net cross-border inflows defined as investments attracted by country i from k minus investments originated by i in k in year t normalized by GDP and logarithmized. Net cross-border inflows are positive when country i attracts more investments from k than it originates there.  is the difference between country i and k (i minus k). All variables are defined in Table 2 . In Columns (1)- (4) and (6)- (9), 16 country dummy variables are included, while Columns (5) and (10) include 13 i-country and 13 k-country dummies. Year dummy variables are employed in all models. In Columns (4)- (5) and (9)-(10) the inverse Mills ratio from a first stage regression (whether or not any cross-border investments are observed in either direction) is included. This first stage model (results not depicted) includes the same RHS variables plus a dummy variable for the same law tradition and language, and the geographical distance between the two countries. White (1980) -heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. In Columns (4)- (5) and (9)- (10) bootstrapped standard errors with 150 replications are presented. ***, **, *, ° denote significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15 percent level, respectively. 
where NCB denotes net cross-border inflows by country pairs defined as investments attracted by country i from country k minus investments originated by country i in country k in year t normalized by GDP and logarithmized.  is the difference between country i and k. Positive values of net cross-border inflows imply more investments being attracted to than originated from country i to country k (i minus k). All variables are defined in Table 2 . The lagged dependent variable is instrumented using past values. Year dummy variables are employed in all models. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Panel a -Domestic investments (one-country setting)
Q
